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Abstract
Recently, several emerging market countries in East Asia and Latin America have initiated
intra-regional reserve pooling mechanisms. This is puzzling from a traditional risk-diversi￿cation
perspective, because country-level shocks are more correlated within rather than across regions.
This paper provides a novel rationale for intra-regional pooling: if non-contingent reserve assets
can be used to support production during a crisis, then a country￿ s reserve accumulation decision
a⁄ects not only its own production and consumption, but also its trading partners￿consumption
through terms of trade e⁄ects. These terms of trade adjustments can be fully internalized only
by a reserve pool among trading partners. If trade linkages are stronger within rather than
across regions, then intra-regional reserve pooling may dominate inter-regional pooling, even if
shocks are more correlated within regions.
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11 Introduction
Over the last decade, central banks in several emerging market economies have amassed substantial
holdings of foreign exchange reserves. This trend has been particularly marked in Asian economies
such as China, South Korea and Singapore. More recently, regional groupings such as the Chiang
Mai Initiative in Asia, and the Latin American Reserve Fund (FLAR) in northern Latin America,
have initiated discussions on establishing mechanisms to pool reserves amongst themselves.1 On
the face of it, the regional dimension of these arrangements seems puzzling from the perspective of
the traditional theory on risk diversi￿cation. If shocks experienced by countries within a particular
region are more correlated than shocks across regions, then inter-regional reserve pooling has better
risk-sharing properties than intra-regional reserve pooling.
This paper provides a novel rationale for regional pooling arrangements, in a precautionary
savings setup with noncontingent reserve assets. Consider a production economy whose output is
consumed by both itself and its trading partners. The economy is subject to shocks to its inputs
for production (e.g., capital). When negative shocks occur, it can use its reserves as inputs and
boost production, which increases both its own consumption and its trading partners￿consumption
through terms of trade e⁄ects. Therefore, a country￿ s reserve accumulation decision has rami￿ca-
tions for its trading partners￿welfare. Such terms of trade e⁄ects are not taken into account when
a country self insures, and are only partially internalized in pooling arrangements with non-trading
partners. However, these e⁄ects are fully internalized by pooling with trading partners. As a
result, if cross-country trade linkages are stronger within a region than across regions, reserve pool-
ing within speci￿c regions can be superior to inter-regional arrangements, even if the correlation of
shocks is higher within rather than across regions.
To make our contributions as clear as possible, this paper is split into two parts. In the ￿rst
part, we focus on the intratemporal risk-sharing dimension of a reserve pooling arrangement. We
construct a one-period model of four countries with noncontingent reserve assets and endowment
shocks. Each region contains two countries that trade with each other, but not with the countries
in the other region. Every country uses its endowment to produce one variety of a tradable good,
which it can trade for another variety produced by its single trading partner. In the one-period
model, ￿self-insurance￿simply means that the country uses its total savings and endowment as
inputs into production. Even in this case, as in Cole and Obstfeld (1991), goods trade itself
achieves some risk-sharing through ￿ uctuations in the terms of trade. Alternatively, the country
may insure against shocks by joining a reserve pool with another country, either inside or outside
its own region.
1The participants in the Chiang Mai Initiative are the ten member states of the Association of South East Asian
Nations (ASEAN) ￿Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore,
Thailand and Vietnam ￿together with China, Japan and South Korea. The current membership of FLAR includes
Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela. See Park and Wang (2005) and Eichengreen (2006)
for more details on the Chiang Mai Initiative and FLAR respectively.
2In the one-period model, a reserve pool can improve risk-sharing by transferring inputs across
countries in advance of the production stage. Unlike Cole and Obstfeld (1991), where insurance
is achieved via transfers of consumption goods, our setup allows countries to use the transferred
inputs to boost production. This improves upon the Cole-Obstfeld optimum because it allows the
reserve pool to a⁄ect the relative output of di⁄erent varieties of ￿nal goods. By ￿xing the relative
output of the two traded goods within the region, intra-regional reserve pooling fully internalizes the
terms of trade e⁄ects of endowment shocks. This bene￿t is particularly valuable if the elasticity
of substitution between the two varieties of traded goods is low. Reserve pooling between two
countries in di⁄erent regions, on the other hand, does not completely internalize the terms of trade
e⁄ects because both countries su⁄er terms of trade shocks from trading partners outside the pool.
Inter-regional pooling is only desirable if the correlation of shocks across regions is much lower than
that within regions, or if the elasticity of substitution between goods is high.
The second part of this paper turns to the more general in￿nite horizon problem of consumption
smoothing via noncontingent reserve assets. We show that the dynamic programming problem of
any reserve pool can be split into two separate subproblems. The solution to the intratemporal
subproblem follows the same logic as the one-period case. The intertemporal subproblem can
be analyzed using standard techniques from the consumption smoothing literature. Moving from
self-insurance to a reserve pooling arrangement brings two major bene￿ts. Firstly, the uni￿cation
of budget constraints results in a single borrowing limit for the reserve pool as a whole and this
improves welfare by expanding the set of feasible allocations for insurance purposes. Secondly,
production and reserve accumulation decisions can be coordinated across countries. Relative to the
self-insurance case, such coordination generates a compensated Pareto improvement.
Two aspects of the model deserve further discussion. The ￿rst concerns the assumption that
reserve pooling entails a transfer of inputs and not of ￿nal goods. This method of modeling foreign
exchange reserves captures the ease with which they can be transferred across countries, and is
consistent with their potential use by central banks to support the domestic production sector (via
liquidity support to banks and ￿rms with foreign currency denominated liabilities, for example).
The second relates to the nature of shocks that a⁄ect an economy. The model clearly distinguishes
between two broad categories of disturbances: ￿nancial and business cycle shocks that can a⁄ect a
country￿ s endowment, and the transmission of such shocks to other countries via trade linkages. For
the purposes of a reserve pooling arrangement, the ￿rst category of shocks is regarded as exogenous
and the second category as an endogenous outcome of the policies pursued by the reserve pool. This
observation should inform how we measure intra-regional and inter-regional shock correlations from
the data. The higher the correlation of ￿nancial/business cycle shocks within rather than across
regions, the less attractive is a regional pool. The stronger the terms of trade e⁄ects of shocks (via
trade linkages) within a speci￿c region, the more attractive is such a pool.
Optimal reserve pooling across countries has received some attention in the literature. Imbs
3and Mauro (2007) ￿nd that the country groupings that yield the largest welfare gains from pooling
risks are usually made up of countries located in di⁄erent regions, which have limited trade links
with each other. This is because countries within the same region have higher output correlations.
Imbs and Mauro (2007) speculate that contract enforceability may be one reason why we see more
regional pooling, counter to the prediction of standard theory. Our model shows that stronger trade
linkages within rather than across regions provide additional support for regional reserve pooling,
due to the internalization of externalities. Aizenman and Lee (2006) provide another reason why
regional pooling arrangements may be bene￿cial, which does not depend on risk-sharing. In their
setup, regional reserve pooling can serve as a commitment device that can help prevent the negative
externalities that exist in an environment where countries are engaged in a game of competitive
devaluations.
This paper is also related to the broad literature on international risk-sharing. In particular,
it builds on the work of Cole and Obstfeld (1991), who examine the role of international goods
trade in the transmission (and insurance) of shocks through terms of trade adjustments. Heathcote
and Perri (2002) extend the Cole-Obstfeld framework by incorporating a production sector familiar
in the real business cycles literature. They ￿nd that only a ￿nancial autarky model can match
both the observed volatility of terms of trade shocks and cross-country output, consumption and
investment correlations. Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006) ￿nd limited gains from ￿nancial integration
in a neoclassical growth model. Our work adds to the existing literature by focusing speci￿cally on
the interaction between optimal reserve accumulation and regional linkages via goods trade.
This paper focuses on the precautionary motives for holding reserves, whereby reserve assets
serve as consumption stabilizers in the face of country-speci￿c shocks. An alternative explanation
attributes the build-up of reserves to a form of mercantilism, where the development strategy is
aimed at export promotion via active exchange rate management. Empirical studies have produced
con￿ icting results in their attempts to disentangle these two explanations for reserve accumulation.
Ben-Bassat and Gottlieb (1992) test a version of the precautionary savings model on Israeli data.
Jeanne and Ranciere (2006) assess the ability of the precautionary framework to explain observed
reserve holdings, and conclude that it cannot explain the recent accumulation of reserves in Asia.
Aizenman and Lee (2005) attempt to disentangle the two motives and conclude that the results
support precautionary motives. The practice of most countries to invest reserves in high-quality
foreign government bonds has also motivated us to model reserves as noncontingent assets. A
relatively recent literature on country insurance (Cabellero and Panageas 2005, 2008, and Cordella
and Levy Yeyati, 2006) emphasizes the bene￿ts of investing in contingent assets.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analyzes the one-period version
of the model. Section 3 looks at the more general intertemporal reserve pooling problem. Finally,
section 4 provides a brief discussion of the results and concludes. The appendix contains the proofs
of propositions in the main text.
42 One-period Model
Regional Structure The world comprises four countries, j = A;B;C;D. The collection of
countries is partitioned into two regions, as shown in ￿gure 1. Countries A and B are located in
region I; countries C and D are located in region II.
Figure 1: World with Two Regions and Four Countries
Each country is composed of a continuum measure one of identical agents. At the beginning
of the period, each agent has x units of reserve assets. In addition to this, each agent in country
j receives an identical stochastic endowment of !j 2
￿
!H;!L￿
= ￿, where !H > !L. The
unconditional probability of the high endowment is 1
2 for every country, but the probability is not
independent. For countries j and j0 in the same region:
Pr
￿
!j = !Hj!j0 = !H￿
= Pr
￿
!j = !Lj!j0 = !L￿
= q:
For countries in di⁄erent regions, we impose the following structure for j;j0 2 fA;Cg:
Pr
￿
!j = !Hj!j0 = !H￿
= Pr
￿
!j = !Lj!j0 = !L￿
= r:
Technology and Preferences The endowment !j and reserve assets x may be used as inputs
to produce the country￿ s unique tradable good yj. The production function is linear in the input
vj:
yj = vj:
Final goods yj can be traded (at zero transportation cost) within regions, but not across regions.





















for j and j0 in the same region. cjk represents the quantity of good yj consumed in country k.
Country j derives utility from the consumption of all goods produced in the same region. The
objective function of a reserve pooling arrangement between any two countries j and j0, whether













Market Incompleteness Countries are not able to purchase insurance on private markets
against the stochastic endowment shock.
2.1 First Best Benchmark
The ￿rst best optimum in this four country world solves the following social planner problem:


































for j;j0 in the same region,




where again, cjk represents the quantity of good yj consumed in country k. The choice of equal
Pareto weights (of 1
4) re￿ ects the fact that the ex ante expected value of each country￿ s endowment
is identical. From an ex ante perspective, UFB = E~ UFB.
Proposition 1 At the ￿rst best:




!j for all j.
(ii) each country in a particular region consumes half the output of each good produced in that
region: cjj = cjj0 = 1
2yj for all j, j0 in the same region.
Results (i) and (ii) hold because the consumption aggregator Cj places equal weight on all goods
yj produced in the same region, and because of the equal Pareto weighting of all countries j in
the social planner problem. Within each region, the social planner can transfer endowments one
for one across countries￿borders. The consumption aggregator Cj then implies that it is optimal
for each country￿ s consumption bundle to equally weight all the goods produced in its region. The
6equal Pareto weighting instructs that consumption must also be equalized across regions. Together,
these conditions yield the results above.





is the socially optimal proportion
of goods in consumption (given the transferability of endowments across countries without cost).
Notice that at the social optimum, consumption levels are equalized across all countries in each
state, but not across all states. This is because the world as a whole su⁄ers from aggregate shocks.
2.2 ￿Self-insurance￿
Now we re-introduce market incompleteness ￿namely, lack of insurance against the endowment
shock. If the country decides to ￿self-insure￿ , it uses its savings to supplement its endowment
and thereby boost its production. In the one-period model, every country j simply uses its entire
endowment !j and accumulated reserves x as inputs into domestic production. Such production
exerts an external e⁄ect on its trading partners. However, inputs are not redistributed across
countries in order to maximize the gains from trade; each individual country does not take into
account the e⁄ect of its actions, via terms of trade shocks, on the welfare of its trading partner.
After production is completed, goods trade occurs within every region. Consumption levels and
trade volumes are given by the solution to the representative consumer￿ s maximization problem
subject to their budget constraint. The maximization problem for the representative consumer in
country A can be written:




















pAyA = pAcAA + pBcBA:
The ex ante utility of country A is U = E~ U. Goods market equilibrium requires market clearing
within each region. For region I:
cAA + cAB ￿ yA
cBA + cBB ￿ yB:
Analogous conditions can be derived for other countries and regions.
7Proposition 2 Under self-insurance:
(i) the quantity of each good produced is determined by the endowment and reserves in the speci￿c
country: yj = x + !j for all j.
(ii) consumption in countries j and j0 in a particular region satis￿es:
cjj =
yj





1 + p1￿￿;cj0j0 =
yj0
1 + p￿￿1;











Shocks to country j￿ s endowment generates shocks to the quantity of good yj produced. This
a⁄ects not only country j, but also its trading partner in the same region, country j0, via terms
of trade e⁄ects. The welfare e⁄ects of terms of trade shocks are not fully internalized by each
individual country.
2.3 Reserve Pooling Within Regions
The reserve pool is not a social planner. Countries sign up to the pooling arrangement at the
beginning of the period. The pool has the authority to require transfers of reserves and endowments
across the members of the pool, prior to the production stage. Thereafter, countries are free to
produce and trade their ￿nal goods output with other countries in the same region, without any
intervention from the pool. The appropriate optimization problem of the reserve pool with countries
A and B may be written:



























for j;j0 in the same region,
cAA =
yA





1 + p1￿￿;cBB =
yB
1 + p￿￿1;











8and subject to the resource constraint of the reserve pool:




From an ex ante perspective, URPW = E~ URPW.
Proposition 3 Reserve pooling within a particular region has the following properties:




!j for all j in the
region.
(ii) each country consumes half the output of each good produced in that region: cjj = cjj0 = 1
2yj
for all j, j0 in the same region.
For pooling within a particular region, the reserve pooling arrangement is able to achieve the
same allocation as a social planner who is constrained to operate only inside that region. Result
(i) states that each country in the reserve pool produces the same level of output. This occurs
because the consumption aggregator Cj places equal weight on all goods yj produced in the same
region. For more general constant elasticity of substitution (CES) consumption aggregators, the
constrained social planner allocation is still achieved, but the optimal relative production of goods
depends on the optimal proportion of the goods in consumption when the terms of trade is ￿xed
at unity. Result (ii) holds because of the equal weighting of all countries in the objective function
of the social planner. This is justi￿ed because the ex ante value of each country￿ s endowment is
identical.
How does this ￿nding relate to Cole and Obstfeld￿ s (1991) result on risk-sharing with goods
trade? In their framework, each country is endowed with ￿nal goods rather than inputs. Taking
the quantities of ￿nal goods as exogenous, they show that trade in goods may achieve most of the
gains possible from insurance via transfers of ￿nal consumption goods. In the version of their model
with goods trade only, risk sharing is achieved exactly as in our speci￿cation with ￿self-insurance￿ .
A country with a negative shock in their endowment of ￿nal goods experiences a positive terms
of trade shock in the goods market. This means a negative terms of trade shock for the country￿ s
trading partner, which experiences a fall in relative demand for its good. In the limiting case as
￿ ! 1 (the Cobb-Douglas utility case), goods trade achieves full risk diversi￿cation in their model.
In Cole and Obstfeld￿ s framework, perfect asset market integration entails insurance via transfers
of consumption goods. The quantities of ￿nal goods are taken as exogenous, and the ratio of ￿nal





. In our framework, on the other hand, reserve pooling arrangements
are allowed to transfer inputs from one country to the other in advance of the production stage,
and these inputs may be used to boost the production of ￿nal goods. Therefore, it is possible
to both insure consumption and always keep the ratio of ￿nal goods equal to the socially optimal





. This strictly improves welfare relative
to the Cole-Obstfeld setup. The quantities of ￿nal goods are no longer exogenously given. Notice
that this result holds for both the CES and Cobb-Douglas consumption aggregator functions.
2.4 Reserve Pooling Across Regions
In this subsection, we consider instead a reserve pool with member countries A and C. Both of
these countries have the same utility under self-insurance, and are members of identical but separate
regions. The optimization problem of the reserve pool is as follows:






























































yA + yC ￿ 2x +
X
j2fA;Cg
!j and yB = x + !B, yD = x + !D:
The ex ante version of the maximand is URPA = E~ URPA.
This is a complicated problem because in addition to their own endowment shocks, both coun-
tries in the reserve pool are bu⁄eted by terms of trade shocks originating from outside the pool.
Nevertheless, some negative results follow immediately.
Proposition 4 Reserve pooling across regions has the following properties:
(i) the quantity of each good produced is in general not identical, within or across regions.
(ii) each country does not consume a constant fraction of the goods produced in its region.
Result (i) constitutes a welfare loss relative to the ￿rst best, because the relative production
of goods deviates from the socially optimal proportion of goods in consumption. Result (ii) is a
symptom of imperfect risk-sharing across countries within each region. Both of these results show
that the reserve pooling arrangement cannot fully take account of the terms of trade e⁄ects of
endowment shocks originating outside the pool. The endowment shocks in countries B and D do
a⁄ect the utility of countries in the reserve pool, even though they themselves are not members.
However, unlike the intra-regional reserve pool, an inter-regional reserve pool can insure country A
against region-wide shocks.
102.5 Main Result and Comparative Statics
We are now ready to present the main result of this paper, for the general case with concave utility.
Main Result 1 Even if q > r, there exist combinations of parameters (￿;￿) such that intra-
regional reserve pooling is superior to inter-regional reserve pooling for country A.
Suppose that one member country of a reserve pooling arrangement su⁄ers a negative endow-
ment shock. If the members of the reserve pool do not trade with each other, the shock does
not a⁄ect other member countries. However, risk sharing instructs that a transfer be made to
the country with the negative shock, from the other member of the reserve pool. On the other
hand, if the members of the reserve pool do trade with each other, then a negative endowment
shock in one country reduces that country￿ s demand for goods produced by the other member of
the reserve pool. In the absence of a reserve pool, the latter country would su⁄er a decline in
relative demand and a negative terms of trade adjustment. Risk sharing again requires a transfer
from the member country without the endowment shock. In this case, the transfer is not a pure
loss in consumption for the contributing country. By increasing production in the country a⁄ected
by the negative endowment shock, the transfer increases the relative demand for the goods of the
contributing country. Therefore the transfer insulates the recipient country from a decline in its en-
dowment, and insulates the contributing country from an adverse terms of trade shock. Therefore,
the bene￿ts of risk sharing from an intra-regional arrangement may be superior to the bene￿ts of
an inter-regional arrangement, even if the correlation of shocks is higher within than across regions.
As in the risk neutral case, an intra-regional reserve pool improves risk sharing, and dampens
terms of trade shocks, by aligning the relative production of each good with the socially optimal





, across states of nature. The concomitant welfare
bene￿ts are higher, the lower is the elasticity of substitution between goods in consumption, ￿.
Nevertheless, under risk aversion, inter-regional reserve pooling may be superior to intra-regional
arrangements if the correlation of shocks within regions is su¢ ciently high relative to the correlation
of shocks across regions (which translates into q being su¢ ciently high relative to r), or if the
countries are highly risk averse at low levels of consumption. The reason is that although the
average level of the consumption aggregator is lower for an inter-regional arrangement than for an
intra-regional one, pooling across regions can improve consumption in the worst states of nature.
If all countries in one region su⁄er a negative shock, but all countries in the other region have
high endowments, then an inter-regional arrangement is superior for risk-sharing purposes. This
scenario is more likely to arise, the higher is q relative to r. The welfare bene￿ts of improving
consumption after a negative endowment shock depends on the country￿ s risk aversion.
11For the ￿rst two comparative statics exercises in this subsection, we use the utility function
u(Cj) = log(Cj); the endowment shocks and reserve assets are given by !H = 10, !L = 2, x = 5.
Elasticity of Substitution ￿ The trade linkages-based motivation for intra-regional reserve
pooling is illustrated in ￿gure 2. To construct the ￿gure, we keep constant the correlation of
shocks across regions (as implied by r = 0:15) and show whether intra-regional or inter-regional
reserve pooling is superior for di⁄erent values of q and ￿. In standard models of risk-sharing with
a single ￿nal good, the elasticity of substitution ￿ is implicitly set to in￿nity, and inter-regional
reserve pooling dominates intra-regional reserve pooling if the parameter governing the correlation
of shocks within regions, q, exceeds r. Consider the desirability of an inter-regional arrangement as
the elasticity of substitution ￿ declines. As this happens, endowment shocks in countries outside the
inter-regional pool exert larger terms of trade shocks on their trading partners inside the pool, and
it becomes more and more costly not to have member countries￿trading partners inside the pooling
arrangement. At some point then, it becomes optimal to switch to an intra-regional arrangement.
Even for q > r, the ￿gure shows that an intra-regional reserve pool may dominate an inter-regional
arrangement.
Correlation of shocks within and across regions (q and r) Holding the elasticity of substi-
tution ￿ ￿xed, the standard risk-sharing argument predicts that an inter-regional pool is likely to
be preferred if the correlation of shocks within regions is high relative to the correlation of shocks
across regions (in other words, if q is high relative to r). This is illustrated in ￿gure 3, which is
constructed for elasticity of substitution ￿ = 1:5. Due to the trade linkages e⁄ects described above,
there exists a set of points above the 45 degrees line where intra-regional reserve pooling is still
superior for country A.
For the next comparative statics exercise, we use the more general constant relative risk aversion




Relative risk aversion ￿ Inter-regional reserve pooling reduces average consumption, but is
superior to intra-regional pooling at insuring consumption after a region-wide shock. It is precisely
after a region-wide shock that a self-insuring country would have the lowest consumption. Therefore,
an inter-regional arrangement is more likely to dominate intra-regional reserve pooling in an ex ante
sense if the country is more risk averse. Figure 4 holds the correlation of shocks within and across
regions ￿xed (q = r = 0:15), and for each value of the elasticity of substitution ￿, shows the degree of
risk aversion such that country A is indi⁄erent between an intra-regional and inter-regional pooling
arrangement. The threshold risk aversion increases as the externality e⁄ect increases (namely, as ￿
declines).






















































Inter-regional Reserve Pooling Optimal
Intra-regional Reserve Pooling Optimal
r = 0.15
Figure 2: Elasticity of Substitution ￿ and
Optimality of Pooling Arrangements























































Intra-regional Reserve Pooling Optimal
r = q
Figure 3: Intra-Regional and Inter-Regional
Conditional Probabilities q and r




















































Inter-regional Reserve Pooling Optimal
Intra-regional Reserve Pooling Optimal
Figure 4: Risk Aversion ￿ And Optimality
of Pooling Arrangements
13Comparison with Cole and Obstfeld (1991) Finally, we compare the welfare of country A
under three di⁄erent speci￿cations: (i) goods trade only, i.e. ￿self-insurance￿ ; (ii) insurance via
transfers of ￿nal consumption goods (as in Cole and Obstfeld 1991); and (iii) insurance via transfers
of production inputs. For cases (ii) and (iii), we focus on the best outcomes achievable by a social
planner constrained to operate in region I only. Figure 5 plots the welfare of country A for these
three speci￿cations, against the elasticity of substitution parameter ￿. Case (iii) yields the highest
welfare. From Proposition 3, cAA = cBA = ~ cA. The welfare of country A is




















which is independent of ￿. Case (ii), the Cole-Obstfeld optimum, is inferior in welfare terms
because the relative quantities of the two ￿nal consumption goods are taken as exogenous rather





. The cost of such an outcome is higher, the more complementary the goods (i.e. the lower
is the elasticity of substitution ￿). As ￿nal goods become perfectly substitutable (￿ ! 1), country
A￿ s welfare is just the weighted sum of the two goods; the relative proportions of the two goods do
not matter. Therefore, welfare approaches the level in case (iii).
Case (i), with goods trade only, yields the worst welfare. It is identical in welfare terms to the
Cole-Obstfeld optimum in the limiting case as ￿ ! 1 (Cobb-Douglas utility). As ￿ increases, the
welfare of country A under ￿self-insurance￿is pulled in two di⁄erent directions. Firstly, the terms
of trade become less responsive to endowment shocks, which reduces the level of insurance, and
thereby welfare. On the other hand, as ￿ increases, the goods become perfectly substitutable. This
improves welfare by reducing the welfare cost in those states of nature when the ratio of ￿nal goods








































Insurance using Final Goods
Figure 5: Comparison with Cole and
Obstfeld (1991)
143 In￿nite Horizon Model
This section of the paper is structured to mirror the previous one, but considers the more general
in￿nite horizon version of our model. We show that the in￿nite horizon dynamic programming
problem can be split into separate intratemporal and intertemporal subproblems. The intratem-
poral subproblem is identical to the one-period model of the previous section; the intertemporal
subproblem has the same structure as standard problems in the consumption smoothing literature.
Again, we compare self-insurance to participation in a reserve pool for country A. The particular
assumption for self-insurance is that countries A and B cannot coordinate their reserve usage via
implicit promises of future continuation values, i.e. we assume that the game is memoryless. This
is an extreme case. To the extent that such coordination may occur in practice, welfare under self-
insurance would be strictly higher than the extreme case we consider, but still strictly lower than
the reserve pooling case. Heathcote and Perri (2002) ￿nd that the empirical evidence on volatility
in consumption, output and terms of trade match an extended version of the Cole-Obstfeld (1991)
model under strict ￿nancial autarky. We believe this ￿nding is consistent with the extreme form
of self-insurance considered in this paper.
Modi￿cations to Technology and Preferences The world unfolds in discrete time, t =
0;1;2;:::. Within each period, the technology and correlation structure of shocks is identical to
the one-period model. Endowment shocks are independent over time. Endowments can be trans-
ferred between periods (one for one) but ￿nal goods cannot. Countries do not enter the period
with exogenous levels of the reserve asset; rather, the reserve level of a country in period t is equal
to the endowment transferred from period t ￿ 1. The notation is amended in the obvious manner
(for example, xjt represents the reserve level of country j at time t).








where ￿ 2 (0;1) is the discount factor. The objective function of the reserve pooling arrangement
is amended in the same way.
Market Incompleteness The market incompleteness is unchanged relative to the one-period
model: there are no private markets for insurance against countries￿stochastic endowment shocks.
153.1 First Best Benchmark










































for j;j0 in the same region,
cAAt + cABt + cBBt + cBAt + cCCt + cCDt + cDDt + cDCt ￿ yt;
xt+1 ￿ xt +
X
j2fA;B;C;Dg
!jt ￿ yt with xt+1 ￿ 0;
where cjkt represents the quantity of good yj consumed in country k in period t. The ￿nal constraint
re￿ ects the world storage technology. The choice of equal Pareto weights (of 1
4) in the maximand
again re￿ ects the fact that the ex ante expected value of each country￿ s endowment is identical.
This general optimization problem can be split into two related subproblems. The social plan-
ner￿ s recursive Bellman equation captures the intertemporal subproblem and is used to derive the
optimal savings decision. The intratemporal component of the social planner￿ s problem refers to
the consumption optimization decisions within each period t.
Proposition 5 At the ￿rst best:
(i) the optimal path of savings fxt+1g
1
t=0 solves the Bellman equation:
V FB (zt) = max
xt+1￿0
￿
WFB (zt ￿ xt+1) + ￿EV FB (zt+1)
￿
;
where zt = xt +
P
j2fA;B;C;Dg
!jt. WFB (￿) is de￿ned from the intratemporal subproblem:


































for j;j0 in the same region,
cAA + cAB + cBB + cBA + cCC + cCD + cDD + cDC ￿ ￿:
Therefore, within each period t:









(iii) each country in a particular region consumes half the output of each good produced in that
region: cjjt = cjj0t = 1
2yjt for all j, j0 in the same region.
Notice that the intratemporal subproblem follows exactly the same structure as the one-period
version of the model. Results (ii) and (iii) follow directly from the one-period model. For the ￿rst
best case, the Bellman equation can be simpli￿ed.
Corollary 1 At the ￿rst best, the Bellman equation takes the following form:









+ ￿EV FB (zt+1)
￿
:
Therefore, the policy function xt+1 (zt) does not depend on the elasticity of substitution para-
meter ￿. At the optimum, the social planner builds up some savings for intertemporal consumption
smoothing. This is because the world su⁄ers from aggregate shocks.
3.2 Self-insurance
In an in￿nite horizon model without private insurance contracts, country A can imperfectly smooth
consumption over time by accumulating savings during benign periods and drawing down its assets
after negative endowment shocks. Restricting the strategy space to memoryless strategies, country
A￿ s optiminization problem can be written:


























pAtyAt = pAtcAAt + pBtcBAt
xAt+1 ￿ xAt + !At ￿ yAt with xAt+1 ￿ 0:
The goods market clears in every period. For region I:
cAAt + cABt ￿ yAt
cBAt + cBBt ￿ yBt:
17Proposition 6 Under self-insurance:
(i) the optimal path of savings fxAt+1g
1
t=0 solves the Bellman equation:
V (zAt;zBt) = max
xAt+1￿0
fW (zAt ￿ xAt+1;zBt ￿ xBt+1) + ￿EV (zAt+1;zBt+1)g
subject to
xBt+1 = xBt+1 (zAt;zBt);
where zjt = xjt + !jt. W (￿A;￿B) is de￿ned from the intratemporal subproblem:




















pAyA = pAcAA + pBcBA;
where prices are derived from good market clearing:
cAA + cAB ￿ ￿A
cBA + cBB ￿ ￿B:
Therefore, within each period t:
(ii) the quantity of each good produced in the region is not identical. yAt is determined by the
endowment shock, inherited reserve level and savings decision of country A: yAt = xAt+!At￿xAt+1.





















The intratemporal component of the problem follows exactly the same structure as in the one-
period model conditional upon the production levels yAt and yBt. Results (ii) and (iii), for the
intratemporal subproblem, should be familiar from the one-period case. However, the savings deci-
sions (and therefore, production levels) of countries A and B are the result of a more sophisticated
in￿nite horizon maximization problem.
18Let us consider the Bellman equation in more detail. Country A recognizes that the utility
of its representative consumer depends not only on the domestic endowment shock and reserve
level, but also on the endowment shock and reserve level in country B (through the e⁄ect of the
latter variables on country B￿ s production decision, which in turn a⁄ects the relative price of ￿nal
goods). Therefore, the optimal savings and production decision of country A is a function of the
endowment shocks and reserve levels in all the countries in region I. Country A takes the optimal
policies of country B as given. In equilibrium, of course, the optimal policy functions of the two ex
ante identical countries are symmetric.
What does the optimal policy function xAt+1 (zAt;zBt) look like? Figure 6 illustrates the shape
of the policy function for country A. We use the utility function u(Cj) = log(Cj) and discount
factor ￿ = 0:6; endowment shocks are given by !H = 10, !L = 2. The elasticity of substitution
between ￿nal goods produced in the same region is ￿ = 1:5, and the parameter q, governing the
correlation of shocks within regions, is set to 0:2. Country A decides to save more if it enters the
period with higher levels of reserve assets, or if it receives a high endowment shock. However, it
saves a fraction of any positive endowment shock, so production and consumption levels are also
increasing in reserve assets and endowments. Moreover, trade linkages link the optimal savings
and production decisions of country A to the reserve level and endowment of country B. The
higher is the reserve level and/or endowment of country B, the higher is the production of good
B, which means that country A bene￿ts from a positive terms of trade shock. In response to this

























Figure 6: Optimal Policy Function xAt+1 (zAt;zBt) for
Country A























Figure 7: Evolution of Asset Levels for
Country A
Figure 7 illustrates the evolution of asset levels over time, and the boundaries of the invariant
distribution. To keep the exposition as simple as possible on a two dimensional diagram, the policy
functions are plotted assuming that zAt = zBt throughout. zH
At+1 (zAt) plots the sum of reserve
assets and the endowment in period t + 1 in the event of a high endowment shock in period t + 1,
while zL
At+1 (zAt) plots the sum after a low endowment shock. Subtracting the endowment levels
from the chart, we see that reserve levels in the invariant distribution are contained within 0 and
3 units. Simulation exercises establish that the average level of reserves in the long run for this
speci￿cation is ￿ x = 1:4.
Finally, let us conclude by highlighting the externality due to trade linkages within regions.
Due to the market incompleteness, country A uses its savings to self-insure against endowment
shock, without taking into account the e⁄ect of its intervention on the welfare of country B. The
concomitant externality can be identi￿ed from the Bellman equation. Country A selects its savings
xAt+1 to solve this equation, and this optimal choice does not in general maximize country B￿ s
utility. Therefore according to the Envelope condition, a marginal deviation in xAt+1 has a second
order e⁄ect on country A￿ s welfare but may have a ￿rst order e⁄ect on country B￿ s welfare. There
exists a deviation constituting a compensated Pareto improvement. Such a Pareto improvement can
be achieved by internalizing the externality, via creation of a reserve pooling arrangement between
countries A and B. The externality is fully internalized by an intra-regional reserve pool, but not
by an inter-regional reserve pool.
The second bene￿t from joining a reserve pooling arrangement comes from the uni￿cation of
budget constraints, resulting in a single borrowing limit for the reserve pool as a whole. This
improves welfare by expanding the set of feasible allocations, and is the traditional focus of the
20literature on reserve pooling. The welfare improvement is higher, the lower the correlation of shocks
between countries in the pool.
3.3 Reserve Pooling Within Regions
A reserve pooling arrangement between countries A and B maximizes the following expression:






























































and subject to the resource constraint of the reserve pool:
xt+1 ￿ xt +
X
j2fA;Bg
!jt ￿ yAt ￿ yBt with xt+1 ￿ 0:
Proposition 7 Reserve pooling within a particular region has the following properties:
(i) the optimal path of savings fxt+1g
1
t=0 solves the Bellman equation:
V RPW (zt) = max
xt+1￿0
￿
WRPW (zt ￿ xt+1) + ￿EV RPW (zt+1)
￿
;
where zt = xt +
P
j2fA;Bg
!jt. WRPW (￿) is de￿ned from the intratemporal subproblem:



























for j;j0 in the same region,
21cAA =
yA





















yA + yB ￿ ￿:
Therefore, within each period t:








for all j in the region.
(iii) each country consumes half the output of each good produced in that region: cjjt = cjj0t = 1
2yjt
for all j, j0 in the same region.
The intratemporal allocations are identical to the one-period model (conditional upon the total
production level yAt +yBt in period t). Furthermore, as in the one-period model, an intra-regional
reserve pool is able to achieve the same allocation as a social planner who is constrained to operate
only inside that region. In particular, the following corollary holds and the policy function of the
reserve pool, xt+1 (zt), does not depend on the elasticity of substitution parameter ￿.
Corollary 2 For intra-regional reserve pooling, the Bellman equation takes the following form:









+ ￿EV RPW (zt+1)
￿
:
3.4 Reserve Pooling Across Regions
Next we consider a reserve pooling arrangement between countries A and C, which are located in
di⁄erent regions. The optimization problem of the reserve pool can be written:




































































xt+1 ￿ xt +
X
j2fA;Cg
!jt ￿ yAt ￿ yCt with xt+1 ￿ 0
xjt+1 ￿ xjt + !jt ￿ yjt with xjt+1 ￿ 0 for j = B;D:
Proposition 8 Reserve pooling across regions has the following properties:
(i) the optimal path of savings fxt+1g
1
t=0 solves the Bellman equation:
V RPA (zt;zBt;zDt) = max
xt+1￿0
￿




xBt+1 = xBt+1 (zt;zBt;zDt)
xDt+1 = xDt+1 (zt;zBt;zDt);
where zt = xt +
P
j2fA;Cg
!jt. WRPA (￿;￿B;￿D) is de￿ned from the intratemporal subproblem:






























































yA + yC ￿ ￿ and yB = ￿B, yD = ￿D:
Therefore, within each period t:
(ii) the quantity of each good produced is in general not identical, within or across regions.
(iii) each country does not consume a constant fraction of the goods produced in its region.
There are three state variables in this problem. The optimal policy of the reserve pool is to
share risks between countries A and C. This risk-sharing decision depends not only on the shocks
23experienced by countries A and C, but also on the shocks a› icting their trading partners, countries
B and D respectively (because such shocks are transmitted to countries A and C via terms of trade
￿ uctuations). The policy functions xBt+1 = xBt+1 (zt;zBt;zDt) and xDt+1 = xDt+1 (zt;zBt;zDt) for
countries B and D respectively are taken as given by country A; they are themselves the solutions
to corresponding Bellman equations for countries B and D.
3.5 In￿nite Horizon Version of Main Result and Comparative Statics
We present the in￿nite horizon version of the main result in this paper.
Main Result 2 Even if q > r, intra-regional reserve pooling may be superior to inter-regional
reserve pooling for country A.
Figure 8 illustrates this result by plotting the value functions for country A for the three cases of
self-insurance, intra-regional and inter-regional reserve pooling. Again, we use the utility function
u(Cj) = log(Cj) and discount factor ￿ = 0:6; endowment shocks are given by !H = 10, !L = 2.
We set the elasticity of substitution between ￿nal goods produced in the same region to ￿ = 1:5.
The conditional probability of country B receiving the same shock as country A is set to q = 0:2,
while the same conditional probability for country C is set to r = 0:15. To be able to present the
value functions on a two dimensional diagram, the value functions are plotted for the particular
shock realization of zAt = zBt = zCt = zDt in the current period.
For the speci￿cation selected, the value function under inter-regional reserve pooling lies every-
where strictly between the value functions for self-insurance and intra-regional reserve pooling, even
though the correlation of shocks is higher within than across regions.














































Figure 8: Value Functions for Country A under
Self-insurance, Intra-regional Pooling and
Inter-regional Pooling


































































Figure 9: Long Run Average Reserve Holdings
under Di⁄erent Arrangements
Each arrangement for country A ￿whether self-insurance, intra-regional pooling or inter-regional
pooling ￿ entails the accumulation of reserves for at least some realizations of the endowment
shock. In the long run, holdings of the reserve asset follow an invariant distribution. How do
average reserve holdings for region I as a whole vary across the di⁄erent arrangements? This is a
comparative statics exercise which was not feasible in the one-period model. Figure 9 plots long
run average reserve holdings (on a log scale) associated with the various arrangements, for di⁄erent
values of the elasticity of substitution between ￿nal goods ￿. To make the values comparable, the
reserve holdings for the self-insurance case are the sum of the holdings of the two countries in region
I. For the pooling arrangements, the reserve holdings shown are the accumulation of the entire pool.
Average reserve holdings in the long run do not change with ￿ for an intra-regional reserve
pooling arrangement (this is a direct implication of our prior result that the policy function of an
intra-regional pool is invariant with respect to ￿). Under self-insurance, long run average reserve
holdings in region I are higher than in the intra-regional pooling case. Moreover, the average reserve
holdings are non-monotonic in the elasticity of substitution parameter. The intuition for this result
is as follows. If we set the elasticity of substitution to in￿nity, trade linkages within the region are
non-existent. Reserves are accumulated by each country because they are the only tool available for
insurance against its own endowment shocks. As the elasticity of substitution parameter declines,
trade linkages strengthen and each country is partially insulated from a negative endowment shock
due to a concomitant positive terms of trade movement. This diminishes the need for reserves to
insure purely against the country￿ s own endowment shocks. However, for very low values of the
elasticity of substitution, country A su⁄ers severe negative terms of trade shocks when country B
receives negative endowment shocks, and vice versa. Each country therefore has to increase reserve
accumulation in order to insure itself not only against its own endowment shocks, but against those
25of its trading partner.
As the elasticity of substitution parameter ￿ tends to in￿nity, there are no terms of trade e⁄ects
from endowment shocks, and the standard model of risk diversi￿cation applies. Since q > r, an
inter-regional arrangement is both superior to, and requires lower average reserve holdings than,
an intra-regional arrangement. As the elasticity of substitution parameter declines, inter-regional
reserve pooling becomes dominated by intra-regional pooling because the externalities associated
with uncoordinated reserve accumulation become larger, and these are not fully internalized via
pooling across regions. However, the level of average reserves under inter-regional arrangements
remains lower than the level under intra-regional pooling, because the intra-regional pool must
accumulate reserves to insulate itself against region-wide shocks. For very low values of the elasticity
of substitution, countries in the inter-regional pool su⁄er severe negative terms of trade shocks from
countries outside the pool, and vice versa. Since these cannot be internalized in an inter-regional
pool, the long run average reserve holdings increase sharply for low ￿.
4 Conclusion
The main result of this paper is that intra-regional reserve pooling arrangements may be supe-
rior to inter-regional arrangements, even if the correlation of shocks to countries is higher within
rather than across regions. This result derives from the observation that trade linkages are higher
within rather than across regions. In this context, self-insurance via noncontingent assets has re-
gional rami￿cations, because countries use their savings to support domestic production without
considering the e⁄ects of their actions on the welfare of their trading partners. Regional reserve
pooling arrangements can internalize these terms of trade e⁄ects, and thereby improve welfare for
all member countries. The stronger the terms of trade e⁄ects of shocks (via trade linkages) within
a speci￿c region, the more attractive is such a pool.
In the ￿rst part of the paper, we construct and solve a one-period model which speci￿cally
highlights the intratemporal risk-sharing dimension of a reserve pooling arrangement. Regional
reserve pooling aligns the relative proportion of goods in production with the socially optimal
proportion of goods in consumption, and is particularly valuable when the elasticity of substitution
between goods is low. Reserve pooling between two countries in di⁄erent regions does not fully
take the intra-regional terms of trade e⁄ects into account; such an arrangement is only desirable if
the correlation of shocks across regions is much lower than that within regions, or if the elasticity
of substitution between goods is high. In the second part of the paper, we consider a more general
in￿nite horizon model of reserve pooling. We prove that the in￿nite horizon problem can be
split into intratemporal and intertemporal subproblems. The intratemporal subproblem follows
exactly the same structure as the one-period model. The intertemporal subproblem can be analyzed
using standard techniques in the consumption smoothing literature. On the theoretical front, we
26characterize the externality associated with unilateral reserve accumulation. We also identify the
compensated Pareto improvement that is generated when two trading partners coordinate their
reserve accumulation and production decisions. Finally, we use the in￿nite horizon speci￿cation
to examine how average reserve levels in the long run vary between self-insurance, intra-regional
reserve pooling and an inter-regional arrangement.
For the purposes of our model, reserve pooling improves risk-sharing via the transfer of endow-
ments across countries in advance of the production stage. We believe that this modeling choice is
appropriate for two reasons. Firstly, it captures the ease with which foreign exchange reserves can
be transferred across countries. Secondly, it re￿ ects the potential use of reserves by central banks
to support the domestic production sector via liquidity support (in particular, via foreign exchange
provision for sectors with high levels of foreign currency denominated liabilities).
This paper restricts all reserve pooling arrangements to be pairwise arrangements. This en-
ables a detailed comparison of the di⁄erences in risk-sharing properties between intra-regional and
inter-regional arrangements of the same size. In future work, it would be useful to consider more
general reserve pooling arrangements with a multitude of member countries. For the simple models
considered in this paper, the optimal arrangement which implements the allocation of a world so-
cial planner is a global reserve pool. This is because we endow the reserve pool with the authority
to decide the size of all transfers into and out of the pool; this is in turn su¢ cient to achieve
full risk-sharing between all the members of the pool. We are currently extending our analysis to
frameworks where the volume of transfers is decided in each period by member countries instead.
This raises the possibility that a global pool may be able to sustain lower levels of contributions
from member countries than a regional pool.
5 Appendix: Proofs of Propositions
Propositions 1 ￿2 and 4 ￿8 follow by inspection, as do Corollaries 1 ￿2. Main Results 1 and 2
are statements that intra-regional pooling may be superior to inter-regional pooling in the in￿nite
horizon case even if the correlation of shocks is higher within than across regions. They follow
directly from the comparative statics exercises.
Proof of Proposition 3.
First, consider the allocation achievable by a social planner who is constrained to operate only
inside region I. Proposition 1 can be amended to prove that in this case, the optimal allocation has
the following properties:




!j for all j.
(ii) each country in a particular region consumes half the output of each good produced in that
region: cjj = cjj0 = 1
2yj for all j, j0 in the same region.
27Next, let us return to the optimization problem of the reserve pool. The reserve pool is in
fact able to induce the constrained social planner allocation described above, if and only if it sets
yA = yB. ￿
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